The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) has released its final report on the engine failure of a livestock carrier that has been banned from entering the country due to persistent safety shortcomings. The report shows that lack of proper maintenance caused the engine failure of the Al Messilah while it was entering the Port of Fremantle, a malfunction that led to loss of propulsion twice in quick succession.
Converted into a livestock carrier in 1997 at the Meyer Werft shipyard in Germany, the Al Messilah regularly traded between Fremantle and Shuwaikh, Kuwait. She was equipped with a Mitsui B&W main engine that delivered about 16,000 horsepower through a fixed pitch propeller.
On March 4, Al Messilah lost propulsion about one mile outside the port. The main engine stopped while the vessel was entering the harbor, and was briefly restarted. However, the engine failed again shortly after, leaving the ship without propulsion while transiting the inner harbor. With tug assistance, the ship was maneuvered safely to berth, bringing what could have been a dangerous situation to a safe conclusion.
While the two incidents of engine failure were troubling enough, ATSB faulted the marine pilot for failing to follow standard communications protocols. When the ship lost propulsion, the pilot tried to contact the VTS service via VHF channel 8, the working channel for tugs. The VTS center follows the international standard and monitors channel 12, so the distress call was not received, delaying proper coordination. The pilotage provider, Fremantle Pilots, routinely used VHF channel 8 for all pilotage communications in the harbor, expecting it to be monitored by all parties including VTS.
Though the incident was a close call, another incident was to occur during Al Messilah's next port visit to Fremantle in April. The ship experienced a complete electrical power loss and black smoke emanated from the engine room, with the cause being attributed to a generator failure. The failure was most likely due to the degradation of the electrical cable insulation, caused by continuous movement due to poor securing, leading to a short circuit in the system.
With multiple safety-related deficiencies being identified during a harbor master inspection, along with systemic shortcomings, including failure to report key incidents such as a mooring line parting and onboard fire, the vessel was banned from entering Australia.
In its final report on the March 4 incident, ATSB established that the engine failure of the 1980-built and Kuwait-flagged livestock carrier was most likely caused by a malfunction of the main air distributor’s servo piston within the engine’s pneumatic control system. Degraded seals inside the servo piston allowed control air to leak between the ahead and astern chambers of the reversing air cylinder. This leakage introduced air into the astern line of the camshaft reversing mechanism.
This likely resulted in the system not being able to maintain the control air pressure needed to fully actuate and hold the camshaft in the ahead position. The camshaft then likely moved to an indeterminate position, which misaligned the fuel injection and exhaust valve timing. This resulted in the engine misfiring and stopping.
The engine failure was an incident in waiting owing to the fact that the main air distributor components, the main engine pneumatic system, and the engine control air system dryer were not maintained in accordance with the manufacturer's guidelines.
The vessel’s owner and operator, the Kuwait Livestock Transport & Trading Company, came under criticism because its planned maintenance system (PMS) did not provide enough detail to track maintenance schedules, and did not have a specific maintenance item to record the maintenance activities on the main engine pneumatic system.
“A comprehensive and well?documented PMS is important to ensure the reliability of critical machinery, particularly systems that directly affect a ship’s maneuverability and safety,” said Angus Mitchell, ATSB Chief Commissioner.
According to the investigation, failure by marine pilots to follow communication protocols was another factor that increased risk. Fremantle Ports’ formal protocols designated VHF channel 12 as the primary channel for vessel traffic service (VTS) communications, and channel 8 for towage operations.
Source : The Maritime Executive
